actors initiate such waves and how both they and the public react to them. While a broader perspective makes research more complex, it provides a richer and more authentic understanding of the phenomenon.
Finally, something should be said about what is meant by a "sudden and significant change in the political environment". I am referring to cases in which certain events and/or issues dominate the public agenda for at least several days. There are many periods when no single issue dominates the public agenda and therefore not all waves are replaced by other waves.
The amount of coverage granted by the various news media is clearly the most convenient indicator of such a change. It is important however, to keep in mind the difference between the indicator and the phenomenon itself. Political waves also include changes in attention by leaders, activists, and the public. Many of these people also depend on the news media as their major indicator for evaluating the state of the political environment. Researchers have little choice but to do the same. Despite the dangers associated with this approach, it does provide a convenient measure for the size and duration of political waves. The greater the number of news articles and broadcast items about a particular issue or event appearing in a prominent position in all of the mainstream media, the larger the wave.
There can be separate waves about the same issue. A topic -such as the Monica Lewinsky scandalcan rise and fall, only to rise again. Nevertheless, because there are so many short-lived waves, it makes more sense to define each individual episode as a separate wave. This is also important because of the very different political context in which each wave takes place.
In this initial article we shall limit our theoretical and empirical focus to two sets of actors who are especially sensitive to the rise and fall of political waves: political antagonists and those working in the news media. The goal of the piece is to explain something about the initiation of political waves, the role the news play in amplifying and structuring waves, and the impact this dynamic has on the political process.
Political antagonists invest a good deal of time and resources in an ongoing struggle for control over the political environment (Wolfsfeld, 1997a) . Some have used the term "permanent campaign" to describe this phenomenon (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999; Pfetch, 1998) . The increasing sense of urgency makes the political environment much more volatile. Political actors must be prepared for sudden shifts in climate that can alter the strategic position of the various antagonists.
Those with political power are often in the best position to initiate political waves. This is an important advantage because those who initiate such cycles can often influence how the political climate will change because of the wave. The announcement of the "Star Wars" strategy by President Reagan, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's decision to go to war over the Falklands, Bush announcement to contest the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and Prime Minister Rabin's decision to sign an interim agreement with the PLO are all good examples such initiatives. Weaker antagonists, on the other hand, are usually forced to react to waves initiated by others.
The Role of the News Media
The news media are the primary agents for amplifying political waves and providing them with structure. The press has a vested interest in promoting waves because such stories serve to dramatically expand audience size. The growing emphasis on "infotainment" and the "tablodization" of news suggests that such waves will become an increasingly important part of political discourse around the world (Dell Carpini and Williams, this volume; Bennett and Manheim, this volume) . Fallows (1994) and Patterson (1998) make similar arguments about the ways in which the modern news media cover politics. Fallow argues that news has become an "endless stream of emergencies" presented within "artificial short-lived intensity". He found thirty such emergencies during the first two months of the Clinton Presidency, many of which proved to be much less significant than they were portrayed. Patterson found a massive rise in the number of news stories that were considered "urgent" in the nineties when compared to stories in the sixties.
The media provide structure to political waves in two major ways. First, they provide temporal structure in that they are the primary agents deciding when a wave begins and when it ends. The decision of editors that a story is either "hot" or "dead" has significant consequences for leaders, activists and publics. While such evaluations are clearly related to the flow of external events, the news media maintain their own internal clocks (Trumbo, 1996) . The ongoing search for novelty means that political waves will rarely go on for more than a few days.
One finds a significant amount of agreement among the news media about the time span of a wave. This is a fascinating phenomenon that provides important evidence about the power of journalistic norms and routines. While a certain amount of this correspondence can be attributed to the news media monitoring each other, there appears to be an unspoken agreement among editors about how long a news story should last. This is one of a number of routines that lowers the amount of diversity in media coverage. It is rooted in a rigid professional culture whose rules come to be taken for granted by journalists in the western world.
The news media also provide narrative structure to political waves (Gamson, et. al., 1992; McComas & Shanahan, 1999) . They do so by providing citizens with a fairly common view of the major actors, events, and themes. The construction and impact of media frames has become a major area of research in political communication (for reviews see : Entman, 1993; Scheufele, 1999) . Here we are interested in understanding how the adoption of a particular media frame influences the construction of news stories and interactions with various antagonists. The fact that the same basic story line is repeated in so many different media is likely to lead many people to accept it as a common point of reference.
Once a wave has been identified the news media become massive search engines looking for any information and events which can be linked to the story. The best evidence on this point is provided by German scholars studying what they call "key events" (Brosius and Eps, 1995; Kepplinger and Habermeir, 1995) . They found convincing evidence that such events change the criteria for the news selection, giving the false impression that there had subsequently been a rise in similar events such as traffic fatalities, cases of AIDS, and attacks on aliens and asylum seekers in Germany. The change in political context that is associated with political waves leads to a change in how the news media process information.
These same processes also take place within the context of routine reporting. The major difference is that when the media deal with waves everything becomes intensified. The issue dominates news coverage to such an extent that few can avoid knowing about it. Journalists go into crisis mode and franticly search for any stories that can be thematically linked to the issue.
The changes in the political environment associated with major waves have an impact on antagonists, journalists, and the public.
Influences on the Political Process
When a particular issue becomes "the story" being covered by all of the news media, political actors are forced to react. The news media thus become important agents not only in establishing leaders' political agenda but also in accelerating the pace of decision making. Patterson (1998) , in his important essay on time and news, also talks about this problem: "In Western democracies, the politics of time is increasingly the politics of news time, often with adverse consequences for policy and opinion".
On the international level this phenomenon is known as the "CNN effect" (Livingston, 1997) , but a similar process can also occur on the domestic scene. One example is provided in a study by Ungar (1992) . The summer of 1988 proved to be particularly hot and the news media decided that the culprit was "global warming". Leaders in the U.S., Canada, and Britain were all forced to propose solutions for the problem. In hindsight, it seems that El Nino -which became the hot topic in 1997/98 -provided a much better explanation for the sudden change in weather.
When story lines run in a particular direction it can influence antagonists' tactics and strategies and their political fortunes. The shooting at Columbine High School in April of 1999 provides an excellent example. The massive amount of publicity associated with that event provided an important opportunity for gun control advocates to rally support for new legislation. The NRA stood as the accused in that incident and was forced to devote a considerable amount of time and resources to damage control.
The entertainment industry also came under serious attack leading to a number of policy changes.
The publicity associated with political waves has an especially powerful impact on weaker antagonists. If they become one of the principle actors in the story line it can dramatically increase their level of political standing. Media status can often be converted to political status. If the publicity is also in the right direction, it can also have a major impact on mobilization efforts. Social movements are often forced to wait for such critical moments to make progress (Joppke, 1994; Staggenborg, 1993; Ungar, 1992 ). Clinton's threat to attack Iraq in February of 1998, for example, provided an important opportunity for the mobilization of anti-war movements in the United States.
One of the only ways for weaker antagonists to initiate a political wave is through political violence. The largest waves are generated through acts of terrorism and this will be the focus of the present analysis. Most of the literature in this field deals with the symbiotic relationship between journalists and terrorists (See for example : Nacos, 1996; Paletz & Shmid, 1992; Picard, 1993 , Schaffert, 1992 Weimann, 1994) . The emphasis in this study will be to look at terrorists as simply one more type of antagonist attempting to influence the political environment. Many "back-door challengers" (Wolfsfeld, 1997a) turn to political violence in order to get their message through and the media's addiction to excitement assures such groups a prominent place on the public agenda.
Research Strategy
This study seeks to provide evidence in support of three major arguments: 1) Political antagonists often initiate political waves as a means of furthering political goals and the news media play a central role in this strategy. 2) The news media play an important role in constructing the political environment by amplifying political waves and by providing them with temporal and narrative structures. 3) Changes in the political environment associated with political waves have important influences on the interactions between journalists and antagonists and on the political process.
The research will focus on a major bout of terrorism that Israel endured between October, 1994 and January 1995. The Rabin government was attempting to convince the Israeli public about the benefits of the Oslo peace process. The right wing opposition in Israel was firmly against the accords, arguing that concessions to the Palestinians would endanger Israeli security. There were also two major Palestinian groups opposed to the agreement: Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. They carried out a number of attacks during this period in an attempt to derail the accords, each of which led to political waves of grief and anger in Israel.
The research carried out below was part of a larger study looking at the role of the Israeli news media in the Oslo peace process (Wolfsfeld, 1997b (Wolfsfeld, , 1997c . The topic of political waves was one part of this project that employed two major methodologies. The first consisted of turning to expert informants who knew about the norms and routines that characterized their behavior during the waves. These transcripts will be used to demonstrate the reasoning behind the initiation of political waves (argument 1) and how journalists and antagonists deal with the onset of waves (argument 3). The second set of data comes from a content analysis of newspaper coverage concerning one particular wave: the terrorist attack at the Beit Lid junction that took place on January 23, 1995. This part of the analysis will allow us to look at the questions concerning the media's role in amplifying and structuring political waves (argument 2).
Semi-structured interviews were carried out with a wide selection of political leaders, advisors, and journalists who were all involved in creating the news about the Oslo peace process. A total of 41 individuals were questioned over a period that lasted from July 1994 to December 1995. This period runs from about a year after the breakthrough at Oslo to a month after the Rabin assassination. Interviews were carried out with representatives from the Rabin/Peres governments (seven interviews), the Israeli opposition parties (eight interviews), the Palestinian authority (six interviews), and the Palestinian opposition (seven interviews). The major criterion for being interviewed was that the individual had an ongoing relationship with the Israeli press concerning the Oslo peace process. Thirteen journalists were interviewed who had covered the peace process for newspapers, television and radio. The journalists were selected based on the importance of their news organ and their area of responsibility. Most interviews lasted for about an hour. All were taped and then transcribed.
The fact that we were able to carry out interviews with members of the Islamic movement Hamas provided a unique opportunity to better understand their motivations and strategies in initiating terrorism waves. The leaders who were interviewed were members of the "political" wing of the movement that is separate from the "military" branch that carries out the actual attacks. The operating assumption was that these leaders were in a position to tell us something about the role of the media played in the movement's overall strategy.
Semi-structured interviews use a standard set of questions but also provide the flexibility of following up interesting leads that emerge during the sessions. While this particular analysis deals specifically with terrorism waves, the larger study also looks at other types of waves that occurred during this period. Leaders and advisors were asked about such issues as the amount of organization and resources devoted to dealing with the news media, media strategies, the structure and nature of the ongoing relationships with reporters, periods of conflict and cooperation with reporters, perceptions about the degree of success in getting their frames about the peace process into the news media, perceptions about the degree of success other antagonists were having, the influence of political bias on their ability to promote their messages, the influence of political context on their ability to promote their messages, perceptions about any changes that have occurred in media images of the Palestinians since the breakthrough at Oslo, and the influence of the media on the process itself.
Journalists were asked many of these same questions. They were also asked about such issues as: the varying abilities of antagonists to use the news media, journalistic norms and practices for covering the peace process, dilemmas about the coverage of peace ceremonies on the one hand and terrorist attacks on the other, the influence of waves on journalistic routines, the relative status of different assignments associated with the peace process, perceptions about the changes in the way Palestinians have been covered in recent years, and perceptions about differences among the news media in their coverage of the peace process.
The Beit Lid case study looked at all of the newspaper articles that appeared in the three major newspapers in Israel during the four days following the attack (January 24-26,1995) . Yediot Achronot is by far the most popular newspaper in Israel and is characterized by a mostly tabloid format but also employs some of the more serious journalists in Israel. Ma'ariv has an almost identical format to Yediot, and is the second most popular newspaper. Ha'aretz is considered a "quality" newspaper read by a much smaller, more elite section of the population.
The discussion will be divided into three parts which coincide to the three arguments formulated above. The first section will deal with the logic behind the initiation of terrorism waves. Starting with this perspective serves as an important reminder that the news media are one element in a much larger world of politics. The second section deals with the specific example of Beit Lid in an attempt to illustrate the role the news media play in amplifying and structuring such waves. The third and final section looks at the influence these changes had on interactions between journalists and the various political actors and on the political process.
The Initiation of Terrorism Waves
The first two years of the Oslo peace process were marked by an unusually high number of emotional highs and lows. The Israeli public was led from the thrill of the initial breakthrough to the despair over busses blowing up in terrorist attacks, from the signing of the peace treaty with Jordan to the assassination of the Prime Minister Rabin. All of these waves were based on genuinely important events.
The period between October of 94' and January of 95' was particularly unsettling. There had been a terrorist attack in Jerusalem on October 9, and the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier by the name of Nachshon Wachsman a few days later. The kidnapping drama lasted several days with video tapes from his captors being shown on Israeli television. Wachsman was then killed in the attempt to rescue him. As with many opposition movements, Hamas employs political violence as a means of establishing standing (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993) . There is little doubt that Hamas was very successful using this strategy. They became major players and their movement and their attacks had a powerful and detrimental impact on the Oslo peace process. One of the Hamas leaders talked directly about the use of "military actions" as a means of achieving standing.
The military actions are just a means of getting the message across to the Israeli society to get the minimal conditions of Hamas. Our message is clear. The military actions come in order to pressure the Israeli decision-makers to pay attention to what we say and to hear our opinions and our demands. We want Israeli citizens to come to a conclusion that there will be no peace without negotiating with the Hamas movement. (Interview #25; June 8, 1995)
The Israeli news media play a critical role is this strategy. This does not mean, as some might argue, that a lack of news coverage would eliminate terrorism. The news media are however considered powerful tools for amplifying the impact of the attacks. Ironically, many of the Hamas people who were interviewed found the "Zionist" press a more efficient tool than their own, not only for sending messages to the Israelis, but also to their own people. One of the leaders put it this way:
The enemy can sometimes serve us indirectly. We don't have any large news institutions that will publicize and cover the things that we're interested in. . . So in the end, the Hamas actions force the media to report and relate to the activities and positions of the movement. I want to use the military actions to prove my abilities on both the local and regional level. The Israeli press helps with this. Therefore, through my military action I am trying to pass a message that Hamas is a central force among the Palestinians and it is impossible to ignore it. (35; June 8, 1995) In order to insure the maximum impact, movement leaders must insure that dealing with the news media is an integral part of the operational plan:
The military actions of the Hamas are carried out by the Az Aldin Elkasam unit. After every action of those units always comes a press release on the action carried out, explaining their claims or their demands. Before carrying out every action they prepare a press release including films and pictures about what needs to be shown or explained. Thus, the media dimension is very important in this context. (25; June 8, 1995) It is a mistake however, to see terrorism as a publicity stunt. It is rooted in desperation and a deep seeded anger against a more powerful force. The media increase the effectiveness of such actions by amplifying the message to the point where none of the parties can ignore it. It is hardly surprising therefore that those who carry out such acts will do everything in their power to insure that they get the maximum amount of coverage for their actions. In this sense at least, those who carry out terrorism are no different from any other political antagonist. They want to initiate political waves that will allow them the maximum amount of public attention.
The Media Construction of Political Waves
The purpose of this section is to examine the role of the news media in amplifying and providing structure to political waves. The newspaper coverage of the terrorist attack at Beit Lid provides graphic evidence on this point.
As noted, the attack on Beit Lid took place in the early morning of January 22, 1995. 2 The number of articles published in the three major newspapers is detailed in Table 1. This table is important for it provides evidence of how the news media both amplified and provide temporal structure to such waves.
As can been seen, it is a massive amount of attention: 191 articles in three newspapers over an extremely short period of time. These numbers do not even include the large number of pictures which, in the two popular papers (Yediot Achronot and Ma'ariv) often took up an entire tabloid page.
[ Table 1 About Here]
What is fascinating is that the wave ends as abruptly as it begins, and it does so at exactly the same moment in all three newspapers. While Ha'aretz published two articles on the 26th, the story is basically over on the 25th. The event that had been so enormously important to Israel just three days before was no longer worth mentioning. The sudden drop is not related to the start of any new wave: there was only routine coverage on the 26th. All of these editors came to the same conclusion at the same time:
the story was dead. The problem of terrorism was apparently no longer worth discussing until it happened again.
This decision about the temporal structure of the story has important implications for both the government and the opposition. The government is no longer under pressure to find an immediate solution to the problem, and the opposition finds it more difficult to exploit this issue as a means of gaining access to the media.
Amplification not only comes from the amount of space devoted to the attack, it also comes from the exaggerated, emotional tone of the coverage. The ways in which the Israeli media deal with such incidents is remarkable. The national radio stations put on special "emergency tapes" consisting of slow, mostly sad music in Hebrew. Television and radio halt all normal programming and dedicate their programming to an "open line": continual news and discussions by leaders, analysts, and citizens. There is no other news, there are no other topics. The attacks are considered a national trauma that the entire community must endure together.
The newspapers -which will be the focus here -play a critical role in this emotional catharsis. A summary of the first day's coverage in the three newspapers is presented in Table 2 . The front pages of the two most popular papers are covered with portrait photographs of the dead staring out at the readers.
The massive red headline in Yediot Achronot read: "The children that won't return". The Ma'ariv headline was "With tears of rage". A short biographical piece was written about every victim and their grieving families.
[ Table 2 About Here]
An incredible amount of space is devoted to the pictures and reports of the horror and grief. On the first day Ma'ariv devotes 10 full pages and Yediot 9 full pages. On the second day (not shown)
Ma'ariv devoted another 10 full pages and Yediot gave another 9 pages. The stories include appalling stories by eyewitnesses and the victims' families.
The coverage in the more quality newspaper Ha'aretz provides an important contrast, for it illustrates that the same event can be covered in a much less emotional style. Here the emphasis is on detached analysis rather than emotional catharsis. Thus, the first day's headline read: "19 killed from the two bombs at Beit Lid Junction; closure imposed on the territories". The portraits of the victims are placed on page 3. Perhaps even more important is the fact that there are also other news stories on the front page, and throughout the newspaper including other stories relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
These differences in tone also continue in the second day. As noted, the popular newspapers devoted a massive amount of attention to the funerals and the national mourning. Ha'aretz, on the other hand, printed almost nothing along this line.
Perhaps there is no objective means of deciding which type of coverage is more appropriate.
Eyewitnesses to the horror of a terrorist attack would probably react like the two popular newspapers.
What is clear is that the fact that the vast majority of Israelis are exposed to the more sensationalist, emotional coverage -which is then reinforced by the horrific images being shown on television -serves to dramatically increase the social impact of the wave. Leaders operating in a political environment which was defined by the Ha'aretz tone might be in a better position to think about more long-range policies concerning terrorism. As discussed, this apparently was the situation before the rise in sensationalist news coverage in Israel.
Narrative Structure
The news media also provide a narrative structure to political waves by providing an authoritative account of the major actors and events associated with a wave, and by thematically organizing information in ways which serve both their own professional interests and the cultural sensitivities of their audience. The construction of a narrative structure should be seen as a joint effort among journalists, antagonists, and the public.
News coverage of disaster waves, which include terrorism, run along fairly predictable lines. The news media construct stories that correspond with public reactions to the event: sorrow over the loss of human life, anger at any who can be held responsible, and an intensive search for some type of solution.
There are also more "technical" stories that provide details about how the disaster took place.
The Beit Lid story ran along just these lines. In addition to the technical details of the incident, the news stories centered on three major themes: grief over the dead and wounded, anger at the Palestinians, and an almost desperate search for some way to prevent future acts of terror. The Israeli media conducted a massive search for any information that could be related to these three themes. Given time constraints and the enormous amount of space allocated to the story, journalists have little choice but to lower their normal standards of evaluation. Stories that would not normally be considered worthy of publication are included because they can be easily integrated into existing slots.
The stories about the horror and the mourning in the two popular newspapers were structured by using organizing captions to thematically connect a number of different stories under the same headings. This is a standard routine for covering waves in Israel and even includes a (literal) frame to indicate which stories fall under the same heading. The first day's organizing captions centered on the initial shock: "Death on the way to the base" (Yediot Achronot, 1/23, pp. 3-11) and "Hell [Tofet] at Paratroopers Junction" (Ma'ariv pp. 2-10). The second day focused on the theme that the whole country was suffering:
"The country is crying (Ma'ariv 2-11), "A country in mourning" (Yediot Achronot, 1/24, pp. 1,3,5,7,9).
These captions not only provide a structural link to the stories, but also allow the editor to integrate the many photo images into the overall narrative.
Decisions about narrative structure influence the collection of information. A good example of this process is the decision by Ha'aretz not to put a major emphasis on the grief and mourning theme.
Because of this decision, no reporters were sent to cover the many funerals taking place on the second day of the coverage. These journalists were then assigned to cover the other aspects of the story deemed to be more important by Ha'aretz editors.
The stories about grief and mourning were already described in detail. The discussion turns then, to the stories having to do with the other two themes: anger at the Palestinians, and the search for solutions. The rage against the Palestinians and the accompanying doubts about the peace process was an important theme in all three days of coverage. The anger is directed at all the Palestinians and specifically at Arafat. Examining these news stories one gets a better understanding of how sources, journalists, and publics cooperate in constructing such items (see also : Just et. al. 1996 ).
There were a large number of stories denigrating Arafat and the Palestinian leadership The President of Israel was one of the first to open the attack by suggesting that "maybe" Arafat is not the right partner" and that "the peace talks should be suspended". The front page of Yediot Achronot (1/23) concluded that Arafat had been reluctant to condemn the attack. A story in Ha'aretz, based on information supplied by a former advisor to the previous government, talked about an audio tape in which
Arafat was purported to have stated that "we are all suicide bombers" (Ha'aretz, 1/23, p.5). There was no information of how long he'd had the tape but this was clearly an appropriate time to release it and to publish a story about it. The next day Ha'aretz published an article which contained a leaked report from the meeting of the Rabin government: "Security forces at the government meeting: Arafat is not keeping his commitment to operate against extremists" (1/24, p. 5b). Yediot had a similar story suggesting that a secret report prepared by the military's legal department suggested that the P.L.O. was constantly breaking the agreement (1/24, p.3). Here too, no information was given about when the report had been written. Other stories focussed on calls by various leaders to end all cultural contacts with the Palestinians and on those Palestinian groups who were "celebrating" the attack on Beit Lid.
All of these items illustrate how a story line is constructed during a wave. Once the initial theme has been established journalists look for any information that can provide empirical support for that theme and their sources are eager to supply it. The theme in this case centers on the anger against the Palestinians.
The third important theme in the coverage centered on the frantic search for solutions. None of the remedies presented withstood the test of time and terrorism continued unabated. But people wanted answers and given the extremely high level of anxiety, leaders had to come up with "something".
Prime Minister Rabin's speech to the nation on the night of the attack became the center point of these discussions. As noted by his advisor the goal of this speech was to "calm" the people. Part of the strategy was to promise revenge: "We will destroy the murderers: no border will stop us" and a dramatic message to the terrorists: "We will come after you and we will win". The other part was a grand plan for "separation" from the territories using some type of fence or electronic border which would provide a means for controlling the inflow of Palestinians. Rabin's separation proposal provided the news media with an important new angle for the terrorism story, a means of filling the enormous news hole that had been created by the attack. Politicians, experts, and citizens could all express their views on the desirability and feasibility of the plan.
There were also many other solutions that were suggested for dealing with terrorism, all of which proved ephemeral. The government announced that they would close the territories, not release the Palestinian prisoners as had been promised and would expand their attacks on the terrorist infrastructure.
The police announced that they would use an additional helicopter to increase control on the border. One reporter suggested that the families of suicide bombers should be expelled to another country. A government minister proposed that Israel forbid Palestinian Muslims to come to the mosques in Jerusalem during the holy month of Ramadan "so they will know there is a price for mayhem." One of the religious parties claimed that the real cause of terrorism was that Rabin did not observe the Jewish Sabbath.
The search for a solution provides a fitting end to the narrative. The story begins with the shock and grief over the loss of life, continues with the rage towards the perpetuators, and concludes with a number of proposals for revenge. The sad truth is that there are never any short-term solutions to terrorism, especially when suicide bombers are involved. Nevertheless, given the enormous amount of grief and fear associated with such waves, such a message would be culturally unacceptable. The end of the wave brings a certain relief. Terrorism is no longer an issue worth discussing and the political process moves on to other topics. The story -at least for a time -is over.
The Impact of Changes in the Political Environment
Acts of terrorism are a major jolt to any political system. Political leaders, activists, and journalists all abandon their normal routines and move into a crisis mode of operation. Nevertheless, all of these actors have been through previous waves and thus they have established routines for dealing with them.
Every terrorist attack during this period was considered a major failure for the Rabin government.
Israelis had been promised an end to violence; terrorism was seen as a clear indication that the Oslo accords were not working. There was no doubt that this wave was considered a government failure, the direction of the wave was very clear. The euphoria in the early days of Oslo were being replaced by the need for damage control. The cultural resonance of competing frames varies along with changes in political context (Wolfsfeld, 1997a) . One of Rabin's advisors talked about these changes in fortune:
In certain areas my message is the main message. In other instances it is the message of the opposition or other forces that influence the final journalistic product. For example, when it comes to terrorism, you have to remember that I don't have a strong explanation for the terrorism issue. I am hurt by terrorism as much as the opposition. I just say that if I stop the process it would be a mistake, because they would only increase terrorism. . . The problem is that when there is a wave of terror my explanation is not strong, and the explanation or the inputs of the opposition to stop the process are just as powerful or even more powerful than mine. (3; May 17, 1995) Almost every one of the journalists we spoke to supported the Oslo peace process. Yet the relationship with the Rabin government became strained and even hostile in the midst of these waves.
Reporters were caught up within the surge of pessimism and doubt. Liebes (1998, p. 79 You have to ask about a day like today. The journalists, including those in the middle politically, are influenced by the atmosphere and I think many support it less, much less than they supported it before. When it comes down to it, they reflect the general political mood, they can't detach themselves from it. (6; May 11, 1995) It is impossible to isolate the extent to which the news media are creating the mood or mostly amplifying it. As noted however, the sensationalist coverage of terrorism in Israel is a relatively recent development. In the seventies and early eighties, terrorism coverage was much less extensive and emotional. Unfortunately, making decisions without public hysteria is no longer possible.
Another Rabin advisor was asked about the public mood during these waves:
Anxiety, fear, extreme attitudes on all sides. One side says give it all up, and the other side says we should kill all the Arabs. And the emotional excitement [Hitragshut] that never existed before (4; March 19, 1995) In the wake of the first two incidents -the Wachsman kidnapping and the bomb on Dizengoff street -Rabin held extremely trying press conferences in which he attempted to defend himself. The journalists -so enthusiastic only a few months before -battered him with questions and accusations.
They wanted answers and they wanted them immediately. Rabin was no longer confident or in control, his performance was weak and unconvincing. After the third attack in Beit Lid, Rabin asked for television time in order to speak directly to the people and avoid the hostile reporters. His chief advisor talked about that decision.
Those three incidents, Beit Lid, Wachsman, and Dizengoff were three unsuccessful things. All three were unsuccessful. Because carrying out a press conference in the midst of hysteria is worst than if you shut up. The reporters are hysterical, and the Prime Minister gets angry with them and answers them hysterically and the results are terrible . . . We thought that the broadcast from his room here, with the flag, would be more calming. We thought that would work. Maybe we didn 't succeed. (4; March 19, 1995) The terrorist attacks provided an important opportunity for the parliamentary opposition to promote its frames against the Oslo process. They had argued all along that the giving in to Palestinian demands would encourage violence. The terrorist attacks provided graphic "proof" that Oslo had failed.
As the death toll grew so did their case against Oslo. The major goal of the opposition political parties was to have the debate over Oslo framed as a conflict over security instead of an internal debate over the chances for peace. When terrorism was everyone's major concern, the need for greater security became self-evident.
Terrorist waves also offered important opportunities for the right wing movements who were opposed to Oslo. In many ways they were much more effective than the political parties in getting the message across. As with any movement, they were forced to wait for the proper event in order to mobilize their members and sympathizers. Within hours of every terrorist attack people were in the streets all over the country. People were angry and it was up to the movements to channel that anger. One of the opposition spokespeople put it this way:
Everything I plan is planned in advance, but even the advanced planning takes into account that things happen from now to now. So if you're going to plan a demonstration in Kings of Israel Square [major site for massive demonstrations], you need a trigger in order to do it. So people say, "O.K., when something happens, when they sign an agreement, when they don't sign an agreement, when the security situation gets bad, then we'll put that plan into action. (18; August 18, 1995) The changes in the political environment also had an impact on the relationship between the Israeli journalists and the Palestinian leadership under Arafat. 3 They too were placed on the defensive during every terrorist wave. At the very least it appeared that Arafat was incapable of controlling Hamas, at the worst that he was cooperating with them. The emphasis on dramatic events made it difficult for the Palestinian leadership to compete with Hamas. A PLO leader argued that the emphasis of the Israeli media on terrorism was destroying the peace process.
I think the Israeli media in general, and Israeli television in particular is not passing on our message, or to be more exact it is passing on the unusual situation like the bombing at Beit Lid. They are using the articles and the pictures to inflame the situation rather than to calm it. The Israeli press and especially the Israeli television should be reporting in a way that helps the peace process. They attack the Palestinians for the Hamas actions as if all of the Palestinians are carrying out these kinds of acts, and they're trying to destroy the peace process. But if they really want peace then the Israeli television should be telling the Israeli viewer about the other side of the Palestinian people. (26; January 16, 1995)
The message of antagonists is always constructed within a particular political context. Just as the Israeli leaders had to change their message in light of the wave of terrorism, so did the Palestinian leadership.
In many ways the terrorism waves accomplished exactly what they were supposed to. They served as powerful counterweights to the euphoric waves that accompanied the peace ceremonies. By January 1995, after the three incidents discussed above, public support for the Oslo peace process dropped to an all time low (Tami Steinmentz Institute, 1996) . The terrorism waves increased the political standing of Hamas and lowered the legitimacy of the Arafat government. All of the leaders, activists and journalists were forced to adjust themselves to the new reality. The news media can not be held responsible for either the initiation of the terrorism wave or for how the various actors chose to react to it.
They did however play an important role in the social construction of that reality.
Conclusion
A healthy democracy demands that citizens have a reasonable opportunity to deliberate on the major topics of the day (Fishkin, 1991) . The predominance of political waves, along with many other developments in modern politics and journalism, inhibit any such consideration. Instead, citizens are taken for a ride on an emotional roller coaster where external events often rush by in a blur of drama and action. It is a thrilling ride, which explains why so many people are willing to line up for it every day.
One leaves however, dizzy and slightly off balance, and in no condition to make any serious decisions about pubic issues.
The news media's need to portray politics as a series of exciting episodes is clearly related to the increasingly thin line between entertainment and news. Political leaders are forced to adapt to this constructed reality, and this in turn has a significant impact on the political process itself. The need for a quick, well-packaged response becomes a central priority. Other, often equally important issues, are ignored.
It is true that the political and media environment in Israel may be especially prone to such waves.
It is a country that has many ongoing security threats and an extremely centralized news media. All of the important news media are organized at the national level and this increases the tendency to monitor one another and to move as a pack. But political waves increase the size of the audience in every country and this provides an important incentive for journalists. While there may be an unusually high number of political waves in Israel, the need for big, exciting stories is universal.
There is one positive aspect of political waves. The onset of waves encourages a wide range of citizens to become engaged in the political process. The fact that a large number of citizens talk and think about political issues -however briefly and simplistically -is a more democratic solution than leaving politics to the elite few. While the political indifference has never been a problem in Israel, it is a concern in many other western countries.
The difficulty is that the mass public is being exposed to a narrow and unrealistic understanding of the issues at stake. The debate over the Oslo peace process is a perfect example of this problem. The euphoria in the early stages of the process was as unrealistic as the despair that gripped the society in the wake of terrorism. The early stages of the peace process were also a joint productions between leaders and the press. The grand "peace ceremonies" staged by the Rabin government certainly made it seem as if the Arab-Israeli conflict was coming to an end. The news media are always looking for closure. They are not equipped to deal with a long, historical process such as the Middle East conflict.
This then is the inherent tradeoff associated with the way the news media deal with political waves. The onset of waves provides important opportunities for a large segment of the population to become involved in the political process. Citizens have a chance to be exposed to a massive amount of information in a relatively short time, and many are motivated to discuss and debate the issues of the day.
The problem is that the norms and routines for covering such waves have a profound influence on how issues are presented. Individual incidents become more important than processes, and drama is often valued over substance. Political leaders find themselves under increasing pressure to provide short-term solutions to long-term problems. The challenge for leaders, journalists, and citizens is to look beyond the turbulence associated with waves in an attempt to focus on the larger picture. Picture of one of the attackers; Picture of "The Engineer".
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